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24th CoNGREss,
1st Session.

[ Rep. No. 629. ]

HousE

01<' REPS.

DON JUAN MADRAZO.

MAY

6, 1836.

Read, a!lt t:1e resolutions therein contained cuncurrerl in by the House.

Mt. E. "\'V HI TTLEtiEY, f:J;.om the Committee of Claims, made the following

REPOI{T:
Tne Committee of Claims, instructed by a resolution of tlte House of
Representatives to inquire into the e:tpediency o.f providing by law for
the liquidation and settlement of the claim of Don Juan Madrazo, for
losses occasioned by the capture and illegal detention of his property by
the ~jjicers of the United States, report:
That a statement of the case, as the claimant says the facts exist, is contained in a libel verified by the oath of the libel~ant; tha said Don Juan
Madrazo, which he presented to the judges holding the Supreme Court of
the United States, on the 28th of February, 1833, prayin~ process ag-ainst
tllC State of Georgia, to make the said State a party def(md~mt in said court,
at the snit of the said non Juan Madrazo.
A more condensed statement is found in the opinion of the court on the
presentation of said libel, to which the committee refer, and make the same
a part of this report.
The court denied process in the case, because it was not competent for
the libellant to institnte a suit against a sovereign State. The claim had its
origin as early as 1817.
;fhe claimant was a Spanish subject, resirling at Cuba, and sent a ship to
Africa, and obtained one hundred and twelve slaves. He says the ship and
slaves were captured by a vessel fitted out at Baltimore, under the flag and
commission of Auly, and commanded by an American officer. The ship
and cargo were taken to Amelia island, then belonging to Spain, but in a
state of revolt ; aud were condemned in an admira~ty court, and the slaves
were sold under its decree, and purchased by "\Villimn Bowen.
The claimant says this court, constituted in a revolting province, had no
jurisdiction of the case, and that its judgment, decree, and order, were void,
and could convey no valid title to the purchaser. The slaves were taken
to the Creek agency, in the State of Georgia. Such proceedings were thereafter had by the authorities of Georgia, that a part of the slaves were sold,
to the value of $40,000, under an act passed by the Legislature of Georgia,
on the 19th of December, 1817, and the proceeds were paid into the trea·ury of that State.
General David B. Mitchell was agent of the United States at the Creek
agency when these slaves were taken there, and his connection with the
~air &. Rives, printers.
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purchase of the slaves, and their being brought to said agency, was ·
by the Attorney General of the United States, under the orders of
President, and a report of his proceedings was made on the 21st of ., ...... u .... ,.
1821.
This report was called for by the Senate, by a resolution passed the
of April, 1822, and was communicated ou the 6th of May following.
printed in the Senate papers, 1st sess. 17th Cong. vol. 2, Doc. 93., to
the committee refer.
·
The disclosures made in that investigation are probably more full
minute than could be made at the present day, so far as . any of the
or officers of the United States are concerned in the transaction.
The rights of the claimant were not then subject of examination.
says he is entitled to the money paid into the treasury of Georgia, and
to the value of the slaves not sold.
From being a subject of the King of Spain, he asks ~remuneration
his losses from the Government of the United States.
'rhere were proceedings before the district and circuit courts of the
States for the district of Georgia, which being referred to in
ment of the case preceding the decision of the Supreme Court of the
States, on the moti{)n to file a libel against the State of Georgia, the
mittce do not consider it necessary to notice. Inasmuch as the tran:sac11on:
involves questions of great importance, and as the claimant contends
according to the principles of national law and good faith, he is entitled
relie~ the committee think it is expedient that the opinion of the A
General of thP- United States should be taken on the statement made by
claimant in his libel mentioned.
It is presumed he would state the case as strongly in his favor as
facts would justify; and if the law is against him on that statement, he
should be satisfied he has no claim on the United States.
The committee propose that the opinion of the Attorney General be-taken
on the statement of the claimant.
As the House of Representatives is not empowered to obtain it, a resolution will be herewith submitted, referring the subject to the Presiderft of
the United States, with the request that he obtain the opinion of the Attorney General us to the liability of the Unit€d States, on the statement made
by the claimant.
If the President shall consider that statement in any particular erroneous,
and that the interests or honor of the United States will thereby be compromitted, then the committee propose that the President cause such further
testimony to be taken as shall disclose all the facts ; and, on the case thus
made out, that he obtain the opinion of the Attorney General whether the
United States are liable to the cluimallt, and that the President communicate
such opinion to the House of Representatives when given.
Resolved, That the Committee of Claims be discharged from the further
consideration of the claim of Don Juan :N.radrnzo ; and that the papers in
this case be referred to th~~ President of the United States, with the request
that he obtain the opinion of the Attorney General as to the liability of the
United States to pay the said Don Juan Madrnzo, (admitting his statement
to be correct,) under the law of nations, for any of the slaves mentioned.
Resolved, That if the Pre;;;ident shall consider that statement in any particular erroneon~, and that the interests or honor o[ the United States will
thereby be compromitted, then the President is requested to cause sue}). furgat~d
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ther testimony to be taken as shall disc.lose all the facts ; and on the Cllse
thus made out, to obtain the opinion of the Attorney General whether the
United States are liable to the claimant.
Resolved. That the President be reque5ted to communicate said opinion
to the House of Representatives when given, if, in his judgment, the same
is compatible with the interests of the United States.

SUPREME COURT, UNITED STA'rES.

February 28, 1833.
JuAN MADRAzo,

(

vs.

(

THE STATE OF GEORGIA. ~

Mr. White presented a libel in the admiralty against the State of Georgia,
claiming relief by the aid of the Court in favor of the libellant, a subJect
of his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, domicilled in the city of Havana.
The right of the libellant 1o maintain this pro~eeding against the State
of Georgia, Mr. White stated, depended on the construction the Court
would give to the eleventh amendment of the constitution of the United
States, which declares that "the judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any su-it in law or in equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." If the Court should be of
opinion that, notwithstanding this amendment, jurisdiction could be entertained in a suit in the admiralty against a State, he asked that a citation, in
the nature of admiralty process, or such other proceedings in the case as the·
Court should deem proper, should be awarded against the State of Georgia,
returnable to the next term of this Court.
The libel stated that the libellant, J nan Madrazo, was a subject of the
King of Spain; that about the 2d of July, 1817, a vessel, called the Isa- ·
belita, owned by him, with all the documents on board to show her ownership and character, cleared out from the city. of Havana for the coast of
Africa, with a cargo of merchandise, his property, to trade there exclusively
on Spanish account, for a cargo of slaves, to be conveyed to the said city,
there to be disposed of for his sole account, property, and risk. On the
coast of Africa the vessel took on board, purchased w.ith the said merchandise, one hundred and twelve slaves, and on the return voyage to Havana,
about the 1st October, 1817, she was captured by a piratical or insurgent
cruizer under the commission of one Aury, or some other revolutionary
tlag of the revolted colonies of Spain, not then recognised as an independent Government, or in any manner authorized to act as a belligerent power
by the laws or consent of nations. The capturing vessel was called the
"Successor," commanded by one Moore, an American citizen, and was fitted
out of Baltimore and in the river Severn, in the State of Maryland, for the
purpos~ of carrying on hostilities against the property and subjects of the
King of Spain, with whom the United States then were, and still are, at
peace; wherefore the capture of said vessel was illegal, piratical, and felonious.
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The Isabelita and her cargo was carried by the Successor into the port of
Fernandina, island of Amelia, at that time a colony of Spain, but usurped
by the pretended patriots or revolutionists afferting the rights of sovereignty,
and a separate station as a revolted independent Government, but in truth
composed of a band of adventurers, chiefly American citizens, united principally by the hope of plunder, and not acknowledged as an organized independent Government ior any civil or national purpose. 'rhere the Isabe]ita and her cargo were condemned as lawful prize, to the illegally commissioned piratical vessel, the Successor, by a tribunal pretending to exercise
admiralty jurisdiction under the usurped and assumed Government of the
place.
The vessel was afterw~trds restored to the libellant, by a decree of the
district court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, exercising jurisdiction as a court of admiralty, upon a libel filed for resti·ution
on behalf of the libellant. The proceeilings in that case arc invoked and
referred to. 'rhe slaves, the cargo of the l sabelita, were sold under the illegal decree pronqnnced at Fernandina, and by oue vVilliam, Bowen. the
purchaser, were conveyed to the Creek nation, where, at a place called
"the United States Agency," within the limits of the said nation, they were,
to the number of 95, seized and taken possession of by an officer of the
United States, and brought within the limits of the district of Georgia.
'rhese 95 slaves were subsequently delivered over to the Government of the
State of Georgia, on pretence that they had been illegally imported. or
introduced, into the United States, contrary to an act of Congress, and in
compliance with the act of Assembly of the State of Georgia, to carry the
same into eilect. A part of said slaves; were sold by the Government of
Georgia, or its officers, or agents, without any form of trial or judgment,
as directeP. by the said act of Assembly, and the proceeds thereof, to the
amount of $40,000, paid into the treasury of the State of Georg·ia. The
residue of the slaves, 27 or 30 in number, remain in the possess!ou of the
State, or its officers, or have been converted to, or disposed of, by the State
for its own usc, or wrongfully delivered to some persons not entitled to the
same: nnd contrary to the will of the libellant. The slaves, or the proceeds
of those sol<l: could not rightfully become the property of the State of Georgia, by virtue of the piratical capture, seizure, or condemnation, or by the
unlawful acts of the pretended purchaser of the same, but the same remain
the property of the libellaut.
'rhe ljbel further states, that the Governor of the State of Georgia, on
the 20th of May, 1820, on the pretence that the said negroes had been illegally ti;msported to the Creek nation, and unlawfully imported into the
United States fi·om some foreign place, with intent to hold them to service
•~nd labor, filed a libel in the district court of the United States for the
district of Ge.orgiai alleging tae unlawful importation, and that a demand
of them had been made by the society for the colonization of free peoplo of
color, which the Governor alleged he was desirous of complying with, if
authorized to do so by a decree of this court. No specification is made of
the number of the slaves, and no mention is made of the illegal seizure and
sale of the slaves in the information, or of the payment of the $40,000 into
the treasury of the State of Georgia.
The libel further states: that '--\iVilliam Bowen, who had purchased the
slaves, the cargo of the IsabelitaJ put in a claim for the whole of the said
sTaves on the 7th November, 1820, alleging that they were his property,
and were not intended to be introduced into the United States, but had
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be<>n carried into the Creek nation for safety, with the intention to remove
them to West Florida, a colony of Spain, the truth of \dlich allegation the
libellant admits. The libellant hearing of the proceedings in the district
conrt of Georgia, :filed a libel claiming the slaves, and the district court dismissed the claims of William Bowen and of the libcH.ant, and decreed in
fi1vor of the Governor of Georgia. This decree, on appeal to the circuit
court of the United States, was reversed, the clnims of the Stnte of Georgia
and of William Bowen were disrnissed, aud that court decreed that the
said slaves should be restored to the libellant, Juan Madrazo, together with
the proceeds of those sold and paid into the treasury of the State of
Georgia.
From that decree the Governor of Georgia, in behalf of the State, appealed to q1is court.
From the district court of the United States of Georgia, a warrant of arrest upon the libel of this libellant was issued, but the execution bejng prevented or evaded by the Government and officers of the State of Georgia,
the same was never served. A monition was al~o issued and served on
the Governor and Treasurer of the State of Georgia.
The libel proceeds to state the proceedin'J"s in the circuit court of the
sixth circuit, in which it was ordered that it should be held a sufficient execution of the warrant, if the Governor of Georgia ~hon ld sign an ncknow- ·.
ledgment, that the slaves were held by him subject to the jurisdiction o
the conrt; upon which, on the 15th of May, 1823, John Clark, the Governor of Georgia, signed a paper filed in the court on the 24th December,
1823; by which he acknowledged that the Governor of Georgia held the
negroes lev.ied on by virtue of srtndry executions by the sheriff of Baldwin
county, ;c subject to the order of the circuit court of the United States, for
the district of Georgia, after the claim of the said sheriff' or prior thereunto:
if the claim in the circuit court shall be adjndged to have priority of the
proceeding in the State court."
The libel states that the executions referred to, had been levied on the
slaves as the property of \Vilham Bowen, and the proceedin~s in the case
showed that the snme did not belong to him. That the libellant relied on
the stipulation entered into by the Governor of Georgia, by which the
jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States was admitted, and he
proceeded to prosecute his appeal in the circuit co •.nt, in which no exception to its jurisdiction in the case was suggested or moved.
In the circuit court the rights of the libellant were esl:abhshed, the illegal
outfit of the Successor was fully proved,. and every other matter shown to
entitle him as a Spanish subject to the restitution of his plundered property.
From the decree of the circuit court appeals were entered to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The libel then states the proceedings in the
cases in the Supreme Court at January term, 1828, as the sarn,e arc reported
in 1 Peters's Supreme Court Reports, p. 110, &c. and complains that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the case, was denied by the Governor
of Georgia, on behalf of the Strte, in direct violation of the stipulation entered into by him consenting to and acknowledging the said jurisdiction,
by which the said court was prevented proceeding to give a decree or judg~
xnent in the case. That by reason of the proceedings ~foresaid 1 and of
oti~er acts of the State of Georgia, her officers and agents, which tfue libel
alleges to have been tortious, and by the sale and dispersion of the slaves,
the libellant is prevented seizing ~nd identifying his property, he is without
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remedy or redress unless this Court will cause the State of Georgia to do
him right in the premises.
Wherefore the libellant prays the Court to award admiralty process
against the State of Georgia, to be issued and served as the Court may
direct, citing the said State of Georgia, as well as all others concerned, to
,show cause why the proceeds of the said slaves paid into the treasury of
the ~aid State should not be paid over to the libellant; the slaves remaining
in the possession of the State restored to him ; a just and reasonable compensation decreed to him for the slaves converted to her own use, or otherwise taken by the State~ and such other damages awarded to him, as the
owner of the slaves, as the Court might think proper against the State of
Georgia, &c.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court~
Ex PARTE MADRAzo.
February 28,1833.
Nh·. Chief Ju,stice Marshall :
The case is not a case where the property is in custody of a court of
admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of any
private person. It is not, therefore, one for the exercise of that jurisdiction. It is a mere personal suit against a State, to recover proceeds in its
possession, and in such a case no private person has a right to c0mmence
an original suit in this court against a State.

